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ABSTRACT
This paper assesses different organizational forms in terms of their ability to generate
information about investment projects and allocate capital to these projects efficiently. A
decentralized approach–with small, single-manager firms–is most likely to be attractive when
information about individual projects is “soft” and cannot be credibly transmitted.  Moreover,
holding fixed firm size, soft information also favors flatter organizations with fewer layers of
management.  In contrast, large hierarchical firms with multiple layers of management are at a
comparative advantage when information can be costlessly  “hardened” and  passed along within the
hierarchy. As a concrete application of the theory, the paper discusses the consequences of
consolidation in the banking industry.  It has been documented that when large banks acquire small
banks, there is a pronounced decline in lending to small businesses.  To the extent that small-
business lending relies heavily on soft information, this is exactly what the theory would lead one
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this work in detail in Section IV below.
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I.  Introduction
In this paper, I take up the question of how an organization should be designed–in terms
of size, number of managers, and the division of responsibility amongst these managers–so as to
most efficiently allocate capital to competing investment projects.  I contrast two basic
organizational forms.  The first is “decentralization”, in which small, single-manager firms
choose between relatively few projects.  The second is “hierarchy”, in which large firms with
multiple layers of management evaluate many projects.  The ultimate goal is to understand what
project-level characteristics lead either decentralization or hierarchy to be the preferred design.
This question can be given a very concrete motivation.  Over the last several years, there
has been enormous consolidation in the banking industry, both in the U.S. and worldwide.  This
consolidation has been accompanied by widely-voiced concerns that the resulting larger banks
will lend less to small businesses, who are particularly dependent on intermediaries for financing. 
And indeed, a number of researchers have documented that, when two banks merge, the resulting
larger entity tends to cut back significantly on its small-business lending.  Moreover, the
evidence suggests that the loans that are cut are, at least on average, positive-NPV.
1
Why would a newly-enlarged bank ever willingly turn its back on a profitable existing
line of business in this manner?  The most common informal argument is nicely summarized by
Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999):
“The larger institutions created by consolidation may also choose to provide fewer retail
services to small customers because of Williamson (1967, 1988) type organizational2
diseconomies....That is, it may be scope inefficient for one institution to produce outputs which
may require implementation of quite different policies and procedures.  These diseconomies may
be most likely to arise in providing services to informationally opaque small businesses for
whom intimate knowledge of the small business, its owner and its local market gained over time
through a relationship with the financial institution is important...these arguments do not suggest
that large complex financial institutions created by consolidation would reduce services to all
small customers, rather just to those customers who rely on relationships.”  (pp. 165-166.)
On the one hand, this informal argument is quite clear in asserting that there exist
“organizational diseconomies” which somehow prevent big banks from being the most efficient
providers of certain information-intensive services, such as relationship-based small business
lending.  On the other hand, it is vaguer as to what the root cause of these diseconomies might
be.  For example, the suggestion that big banks simply  have trouble engaging in multiple
activities that require different technologies (“different policies and procedures”) seems less than
compelling.  After all, most big banks are involved in a wide range of technologically distinct
activities, from check processing to credit cards to foreign-exchange trading. 
So what is it about small-business lending–as opposed to various other banking
activities–that might lead it to be an especially poor fit for a large banking firm?    In what
follows, I argue that the key distinguishing characteristic of small-business lending in this regard
is that it relies heavily on information that is “soft”–i.e., information that cannot be directly
verified by anyone other than the agent who produces it.  For example, a loan officer who has
worked with a small-company president may come to believe that the president is honest,
prudent, and hardworking–in other words, the classic candidate for an unsecured  “character
loan”.  Unfortunately, none of these attributes can be unambiguously documented in a report that
the loan officer can pass on to his superiors.  This situation contrasts sharply with, e.g., an
application for a  home mortgage loan.  Here the decision of whether or not to extend credit is2It is worth noting, however, that this divergence between mortgages and small-business
loans may be shrinking over time.  Improvements in technology, the accompanying growth of
“infomediaries” (such as Dun and Bradstreet), and more widespread adoption of credit-scoring
models would appear to make it possible for an increasing amount of information about small
businesses to be hardened.  See, e.g., Petersen and Rajan (2000) for a recent discussion.
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likely to be made primarily based on “hard”, verifiable information, such as the income shown on
the borrower’s last several tax returns.
2 
The model that is developed below has the feature that although decentralization
necessarily has some disadvantages, it may on balance be a good method for allocating capital
when the projects in question must–like small-business loans–be evaluated based on soft
information.  The flip side is that large, hierarchical firms have a comparative advantage in
capital allocation when information about projects can be hardened, as in the case of mortgage
lending.
With soft information, the fundamental advantage of decentralization is that it strengthens
the research incentives of line managers.  Imagine a loan officer in Little Rock who is responsible
for deciding which small-business loans are worth making.  The quality of the loan officer’s
judgement will depend on how good a job he has done  in terms of information production,
which in turn will be a function of  his incentives.  Under full decentralization, the Little Rock
loan officer is also the CEO of the local bank, and as such has the authority to allocate the bank’s
funds as he sees fit.  Given that he can count on having some capital to work with, he knows that
his research efforts will not be wasted, and hence his incentives to do research are relatively
strong.  Said differently, decentralization rewards an agent who develops expertise by ensuring
that he will also have access to some capital which he can use to lever that expertise.  
In contrast, if the Little Rock loan officer is part of a large multi-bank hierarchy, the4
following problem arises.  Suppose that he spends a lot of effort learning about prospects in his
area.  But then somebody higher up in the organization decides that overall lending opportunities
are better in Tulsa, and sharply cuts the capital allocation for Little Rock.  In this case, because he
doesn’t get a chance to act on the information that he has produced (and because he is unable to
credibly pass it on) the Little Rock loan officer’s research effort goes to waste.  Ex ante, this
implies that the loan officer does less research in a hierarchical setting.  Here the authority to
allocate capital is separated from expertise–i.e., the Little Rock loan officer may be left with no
capital to work with–which tends to dilute the incentives to become an expert.
So with soft information, the advantage of decentralization relative to hierarchy is higher-
powered research incentives and hence better capital allocation within operating units (i.e.,
within the Little Rock office).  Of course, there is also a countervailing cost.  By committing to a
fixed capital allocation for the Little Rock office, decentralization leads to inefficiencies when
lending opportunities are unexpectedly weak in Little Rock and strong in Tulsa.  In other words,
decentralization does not allow for efficient reallocations across operating units, while a
hierarchical design does. Nevertheless, if  line-manager research is sufficiently valuable,
decentralization may on net be the better design when information is soft.
However, things work very differently when the information produced by line managers
can be hardened and passed on to their superiors.  Now, not only does a hierarchy do better in
terms of moving money across operating units, it can also generate more research on the part of
line managers than under decentralization.  This is because with hard information, these
managers effectively become advocates for their units–if they can produce verifiable positive
information and pass it on to their superiors, they can  increase the amount of capital that they are5
allocated.   Here, paradoxically, separating authority from expertise actually improves research
incentives, as line managers struggle to produce enough information to convince their bosses that
they should get a larger share of the firm’s overall capital budget. 
Beyond just saying that soft information favors small firms, the model also produces
several other conclusions.  First, suppose that for some other exogenous reason, it becomes
optimal to have a relatively large integrated firm operating in a setting where information is
soft–say because there are significant synergies across the firm’s different projects.  In such a
case, holding the firm’s size and scope fixed, the softness of information will tend to imply that a
flatter organizational structure, with fewer layers of management, is more attractive.
Another implication is that hierarchies tend to be characterized by inefficient levels of
bureaucracy.  This implication follows if one extends the model so that the hardness of
information is not exogenously fixed.  For example, one might assume that by devoting effort to
documentation and report-writing, a line manager can harden information that would otherwise
be soft.  Because hard information is so (privately) valuable to line managers in a hierarchy, they
will devote excessive efforts to such documentation activities.  Thus in this modified setting, the
costs of a hierarchy do not necessarily take the form of  line managers simply being discouraged
and slacking off, but instead may manifest themselves as line managers working very hard to
generate the wrong kind of information.  In particular, there will be too much report-writing and
not enough soft-information production.
The ideas in this paper build on several earlier works.  I defer a full discussion of the
related  literature until Section V, and only note here the most direct linkages. The capital-
allocation model itself is a direct extension of that in Stein (1997), with the new twist being the6
explicit consideration of line-manager research incentives.  In Stein (1997),  line managers are
treated as passive robots who do not need to be motivated.  Rather, the focus is more narrowly on
the CEO’s incentives to shift resources across the firm’s different operating units–an approach
that naturally leads to a more favorable view of large organizations.  
In arguing that line managers’ incentives may be blunted when they are in a hierarchy and
thus do not have ultimate authority, I am following Aghion and Tirole (1997).  However, a
critical distinction is that in the model of this paper, a hierarchical structure need not weaken
line-manager incentives–indeed, it only does so when information is soft.  In contrast, in Aghion
and Tirole (1997), it is a more general proposition that line managers are discouraged when they
do not have full authority.  Thus the models have quite different empirical implications, as the
example of the banking industry suggests: the Aghion-Tirole model does not say anything about
why large hierarchies might be at more of a disadvantage with small-business loans than with
credit cards or mortgages.
         The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  The basic model is developed in Section
II.  Section III considers several extensions and variations.  In Section IV, I return to the banking
industry, and review the relevant empirical evidence more fully in light of the theory.  Section V
discusses the related theoretical literature on organizational design.  Section VI concludes.
II.  The Model
A.  Basic Structure
The model considers a firm with two divisions, i and j.  Within each division, there are
two potential investment projects.  The projects in division i are denoted by i1 and i27
respectively, while those in division j are denoted by j1 and j2.  Each of the four projects can be
operated at a variable scale; in particular, each project can be allocated either zero, one or two
units of capital.  The firm faces an overall capital constraint, in that it only has a total of four
units of capital that can be distributed.
The capital constraint can be interpreted in one of two ways.  First, one can think of
“capital” as simply cash that can be spent on the projects.  In this interpretation, the firm faces an
overall liquidity constraint.  Although the roots of this liquidity constraint are not modeled in
detail here, they can be easily endogenized, as is done by Stein (1997) in a very similar setting; I
will elaborate on this point briefly below.  Alternatively, the “capital” might represent, e.g.,
access to specialized production facilities.  That is,  the firm might have a fixed amount of  lab
space–which, due to adjustment costs, cannot be increased in the short run–and it must decide
how to allocate this lab space across projects.
Each of the four projects can be in either a G (good) or B (bad) state.  The probability of
each state is ½, and the outcomes are independent across projects.  A project that is in the G state
yields a net output of g(1) if it gets one unit of capital, and g(2) if it gets two units.  Similarly, a
project that is in the B state yields a net output of b(1) with one unit of capital, and b(2) with two
units.   It is assumed throughout that g(2) < 2g(1), and b(2) < 2b(1); that is, there are decreasing
returns in either state.  In addition, g(2) > g(1) + b(1), which means that if one has two units of
capital along with a G project and a B project, it is better to give the G project both units, as
opposed to dividing the capital up equally across the projects.  In other words, it makes sense to
move capital from bad to good projects.
Each of the two divisions has its own division manager.  The division managers are, by3Non-responsiveness to monetary incentives is a common–albeit extreme–modeling
device in papers in this genre.  One way to generate it is to assume that agents are infinitely
averse to risk in their monetary income (though not necessarily averse to variations in non-
monetary private benefits).  See Aghion and Tirole (1997) for a discussion.
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virtue of research effort, able to learn about the signals of the projects that they oversee. 
Specifically, if manager i makes an effort ei, he has a probability p(ei) of observing the signals on
both of his projects, i1 and i2, where the function p( ) is increasing, concave, and takes on values
on the interval [0, 1).  I assume that the division managers have reservation utilities of zero, so
that there is never any issue of satisfying their participation constraints.
The firm also has a CEO, who may in some circumstances undertake her own research. 
The CEO’s research technology is described in detail below.  For the time being it suffices to say
that, because the CEO is overseeing a total of four projects, she is unable to learn as much about
each one individually as are the division managers.  Instead, the CEO is at best able to get noisy
information about the aggregate prospects of each of the two divisions. 
To model the incentives of the divisions managers and the CEO, I follow Stein (1997),
and assume that each agent seeks to maximize the gross output from the assets under his or her
control.  This assumption can in turn be motivated based on: i) private benefits of control that are
proportional to gross output; and ii) non-responsiveness of agents to monetary incentives.
3   It has
the following behavioral implication: each agent always prefers more capital to less, but
conditional on being granted a certain amount of capital, each agent tries to allocate it efficiently. 
Or said differently, the agents in the model are empire builders, but holding the size of their
empires fixed, they prefer them to be profitable. 
Note that division managers’ empire-building preferences create an agency problem4If one makes b(2) small enough (note that b(2) can be negative, since it is a net return),
shareholders will always prefer to give the firm four units of capital rather than five or more. 
This is because if the firm has five or more units, there will necessarily be some states of the
world when two units are invested in a B project, yielding b(2). 
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between them and the CEO.  For example, if manager i has better information about projects i1
and i2 than the CEO, he will, if asked, always say that both projects are in the G state.  As a
result, the CEO cannot trust the division managers to give accurate reports about the prospects of
their projects.
A similar agency problem exists between the CEO and the firm’s shareholders.  However,
the effects of this problem are suppressed in the equilibria that I consider below.  This is because
I assume throughout that the amount of capital that the CEO has to work with is fixed at four
units, so her own empire-building preferences do not come into play.  Rather, given the capital
constraint, her efforts to maximize her private benefits coincide perfectly with shareholders’
objective of maximizing the firm’s net profits. 
Of course, the fact that the CEO is capital-constrained in the first place may be a result of
shareholders trying to check her empire-building tendencies.  This is precisely how the capital
constraint is endogenously derived in Stein (1997), and a similar argument can be made here.
Shareholders can never rely on the CEO to honestly reveal anything she might know about
project prospects, since given her taste for more capital, she will always make an optimistic
report.  Thus the best that shareholders can do is simply to give the firm a fixed, uncontingent
allocation of capital.  By choosing parameter values appropriately, it is easy to set things up so
that the optimal ex ante allocation from shareholders’ perspective is four units.
4  10
B.  The First-Best Benchmark
As a benchmark for comparison, it is useful to compute the value of expected net output
that is obtained in a idealized situation where a single planner has access to perfect information
about all the projects.  This computation is straightforward: simply enumerate each of the sixteen
possible outcomes (four projects, each of which can be in one of two states) and, any time there
is a G project that can be paired with a B project, have the planner invest two units in the former
and none in the latter.  The resulting net output, denoted by Y
fb, is given by:
Y
fb = (5g(2) + 3b(1) + 3g(1))/4  (1)
C.  Decentralization
The first–and simplest–organizational form to be considered is “decentralization”.  Under
decentralization, the CEO does no research of her own and does not attempt to get involved at all
in the capital allocation process.  Rather, there is simply an unconditional, ex ante commitment to
give each division manager two of the four units of capital to work with.  Manager i can then
allocate his two units however he sees fit across projects i1 and i2, and similarly for manager j.  
Given how spare the model is on other dimensions–with no operating synergies across
any of the projects–decentralization is most naturally interpreted as dis-integration.  That is,
decentralization corresponds to the divisions being split up into two separate firms run by
managers i and j, with the CEO out of the picture.  Indeed, Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1999)
argue that a breakup of this sort is the only way to credibly commit that the CEO will not get5Aghion and Tirole (1997) adopt a different point of view, assuming that formal
authority–including the right to make capital allocation decisions–can be irrevocably delegated to
managers other than the CEO. This is an important distinction, and I will return to it later.
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involved in the capital allocation process.
5  
The costs of decentralization are easy to see.  Imagine that the signals for projects i1 and
i2 are {G, G} while those for projects j1 and j2 are {B, B}.  In this case, the optimal thing to do
would be to give all four units of capital to division i, but this cannot happen under
decentralization.  In other words, decentralization precludes making value-enhancing transfers
across divisions.  This can be thought of as a failure to effectively coordinate activities across
divisions.
On the other hand, decentralization may allow for relatively efficient allocations within
divisions.  For if a division manager’s research is successful and he observes {G, B} for the two
projects under his purview, he will do the right thing ex post and give both units of funding to the
G project.  The only question is how much effort he will put into this research ex ante.
To answer this question, note that if a division manager knows the states and can make
allocations conditional on this knowledge, expected net output is  (g(2) + b(1) + g(1))/2.  If, on
the other hand, the manager is uninformed, each project always gets one unit of funding, and
expected net output is simply  g(1) + b(1).  Thus the expected output gain to being informed
under decentralization, denoted by )
d, is given by:
)
d = (g(2) - g(1) - b(1))/2 (2)
Assuming that the manager puts a weight of ( on expected net output relative to effort12
(i.e., his private benefits are a fraction ( of gross output and investment is exogenously fixed),





d     (3)
With two independent divisions each behaving this way, the total net return (on the four
units of capital) under decentralization, Y
d, is given by:
Y
d =  p(e
d)(g(2) + b(1) + g(1)) +    (1 - p(e
d))(2g(1) + 2b(1)) (4)
From equation (4) it can be seen that decentralization involves two inefficiencies relative
to the first-best outcome in equation (1).  First, the fact that research is costly implies that there
will not always be full information about project prospects:  p(e
d) <  1.  Second, even if we
approach the limit where  p(e
d) = 1, Y
d  still only reaches (g(2) + b(1) + g(1)), which is less than 
Y
fb.  This is because under decentralization, resources cannot be moved across divisions, only
within divisions.
 
D.  Hierarchy: the Case of Soft Information
The next case to be considered is one in which there is soft information and the firm is
organized as an integrated hierarchy, with the two division managers ceding formal authority to
the CEO.  To make this case interesting, one needs to assume that the CEO can gather some
information on her own.  If not, she can do no better than to always grant each division two units13
of funding, thereby reproducing the decentralized outcome.  In other words, with soft
information, a CEO who does no research of her own may have formal authority, but (in the
words of Aghion and Tirole (1997)) she has no real authority.
While it is plausible that the CEO can learn something about investment prospects, it
would be unreasonable to posit that she can learn as much in total as the two division managers. 
Instead, I assume that the CEO can only get coarse information about the aggregated prospects of
each division.  Specifically, there is a probability q that the CEO’s research efforts will be
successful.  Successful research means that, if one or both divisions are “stars”–in the sense of
having both of their projects in the G state simultaneously–this star status will be revealed to the
CEO.   The coarseness of the CEO’s research technology is captured in the fact that, even if her
research is successful, she can never differentiate between a division that is “average” (has one G
and one B project) and a division that is a “dog” (has two B projects).
A couple of points about this formulation deserve comment.  First, the CEO’s research-
success probability q is for the time being an exogenous parameter.  In Section III, I will discuss
what happens when q is made an endogenous function of the CEO’s effort.  Second, the exact
way that I have modeled the coarseness of the CEO’s information is not critical.  I could
equivalently assume that successful research allows the CEO only to identify  dog divisions, and
that she can never distinguish between average divisions and stars; this leads to the same results.
Capital allocation in a hierarchy works as follows.  When the CEO’s research is
unsuccessful (which happens with probability (1-q)), the best she can do is to just give each6I do not consider the possibility that the CEO might use her information as part of a
mechanism to induce division managers to reveal their own signals.  One could imagine that if a
manager lies about his division being a star, and the CEO subsequently catches him, he would be
punished with a reduced capital allocation, as in Harris and Raviv (1996).   In my set-up, such a
scheme suffers from two distinct commitment problems.  First, punishment involves ex-post
inefficient capital allocations.  And second, if in equilibrium the division managers do truthfully
reveal their signals, the CEO will no longer have any incentive to do her own research.  
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division manager two units of funding, and we are back to the decentralized outcome.
6  When the
CEO’s research is successful (which happens with probability q), she may choose to deviate from
equal funding, and give one division more than the other.  This will only happen if one division
is identified as a star, and the other is not.  In such a “lone-star” scenario, the CEO has three
options: 1) continue to give each division two units; 2) give the star division three units and the
other division one unit; or 3) give the star division all four units.  It is easy to show that the CEO
will choose the most extreme tilting of the capital budget–giving all four units of funding to the
star division–if the following sufficient condition is met:
g(2)/2 > (5g(1) +  b(1))/6 (5)
This condition simply requires that decreasing returns to scale are not too pronounced in
the good state.  The analysis that follows is most transparent when this star-gets-everything
condition is satisfied, so I will begin by assuming that it is. Later, I will come back to the case
where returns decrease more sharply with scale, so that the CEO gives just three, rather than four
units of funding to a division that is identified as a lone star.
If division managers’ ex ante research incentives in a hierarchy were the same as under
decentralization, it would follow immediately that hierarchy is the strictly dominant7Note that the negative incentive effect that comes from sometimes losing two units of
funding is not offset by the fact that the division manager also sometimes gets two extra units
(four units in total) of funding in a hierarchy.  When he receives four units, the only thing he can
do is invest two in each of his projects, and his information is again not of any value.
8Indeed, the discouragement effect occurs precisely because an “average” division (i.e.,
one with one G and one B project) can lose all its funding based not on its own prospects, but
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organizational form.   This is because ex post, hierarchy allows for a form of selective
intervention.  When the CEO knows nothing about divisional prospects, she does not interfere,
and the outcome is the same as with decentralization.  When the CEO does know something, her
ability to shift funds towards a star division leads to an improved across-division allocation.
The problem, however, is that division managers’ ex ante research incentives are weaker
in a hierarchy when information is soft.  To see why, suppose that the CEO’s research has been
successful, and that she has identified division j as a star.  Division i, meanwhile, has one G and
one B project.  In a hierarchy, division j gets all four units of funding, and division i gets nothing. 
Hence any information that manager i has acquired is not put to use.  In contrast, if the divisions
were decentralized, and manager i had two units of funding to work with, he would find his
information valuable–it would lead him to shift both units to his single G project.   Thus the
downside to a hierarchy is that because the CEO sometimes takes away manager i’s capital
budget, the marginal return to his research efforts is reduced, and he produces less information.
7 
It is important to recognize that the negative incentive effects of  hierarchy arise not
simply because the CEO sometimes has her own independent information about divisional
investment opportunities.  It is also crucial to the argument that the CEO have the authority to
take away all funding from division i–even though i might be able to raise two units if it were a
stand-alone entity–when her research indicates that division j is a star.
8  As emphasized by Steinrather because the prospects of its counterpart division within the firm are so strong.  
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(1997), it is this authority that distinguishes a CEO from, e.g., a well-informed banker.  Thus
what I am calling a “hierarchy” cannot be equivalently thought of as two independent firms
facing a single well-informed external supplier of capital.    
To formalize things, denote by )
hs the gain in expected net output that arises when, in a
hierarchy with soft information, a division manager’s research efforts are successful.  It is
straightforward to show that:
)
hs = (1 - q)(g(2) - g(1) - b(1))/2 + 3q(g(2) - g(1) - b(1))/8 = (1 -q))
d + 3q)
d/4 (6)




hs       (7)
Since )
hs  < )
d, it follows that e
hs < e
d.   By working through all the possible outcomes, it
can then be established that expected net output in a hierarchy with soft information is given by:
Y
hs = (1 - q){p(e
hs)(g(2) + b(1) + g(1)) +  (1 - p(e
hs))(2g(1) + 2b(1))}
+  q{p(e
hs)(6g(2) + 3b(1) + g(1))/4 +  (1 - p(e
hs))(3g(2) + 6b(1) + 4g(1))/4} (8)
By comparing equations (8) and (4), one can evaluate the relative efficiency of
decentralization versus hierarchy.   The results to this point can be summarized as:   17
Proposition 1: Assume that the condition in (5) holds, g(2)/2 > (5g(1) +  b(1))/6, so that
in a hierarchy, a lone-star division gets four units of funding.  Then decentralization always leads
to more research effort than hierarchy: e
d  >  e
hs.   In addition, it  is possible (though not
necessary) that decentralization leads to higher expected output than hierarchy; i.e., that Y
d  > Y
hs.
To see why decentralization can generate higher expected output, consider a simple
limiting case where q = 1,  p(e
d) = 1, and p(e
hs) = 0.  (The latter two conditions can always be
generated by picking the proper form for the p( ) function.)  In this case, equation (4) simplifies
to Y
d =  g(2) + b(1) + g(1), while equation (8) simplifies to Y
hs = (3g(2) + 6b(1) + 4g(1))/4,
implying that Y
d  > Y
hs.   What is going on here is that when the firm is organized as a hierarchy,
only the CEO does any research, and the division managers are totally discouraged.  Conversely,
under decentralization, the division managers are highly motivated and become perfectly
informed.  Given that the two division managers taken together are able to gather more accurate
information than the CEO, this latter effect is more than enough to outweigh any improved
across-division allocation that can be obtained in a hierarchy.   As a result, decentralization is the
better mode of organization.
Of course, this example relies on  p(e
d) and p(e
hs) being relatively far apart–i.e., on
division-manager effort being both important, and responsive to incentives.  If  p(e
d) and p(e
hs)  
are sufficiently close to one another, it is easy to see that hierarchy becomes more efficient than
decentralization: Y
hs  > Y
d.
Although I have, for the sake of expositional simplicity, derived the results in Proposition
1 under the assumption that the star-gets-everything condition in (5) holds, they are in fact more18
general.  Even when returns to scale are more sharply decreasing in the good state–so that a lone-
star division gets three, rather than four units of funding–the basic intuition can carry over.  That
is, when manager i generates information and gets allocated only one unit of financing, (because
manager j has been deemed a star by the CEO) manager i’s information is not worthless, but it
may still be less valuable than if he had been allocated two units of financing.  Thus the threat of
losing some–if not all–of their funding can continue to exert a chilling effect on division
managers’ research incentives.
To make this idea precise, in the appendix I prove the following:
Proposition 2: Assume that  g(2)/2  > (3g(1) +  b(1))/4.  In this case, the CEO in a
hierarchy will still tilt the capital budget toward a lone-star division, but the tilt may be less
extreme, with the lone star receiving three, rather than four units of funding.  Nevertheless,
decentralization continues to lead to more research effort than hierarchy: e
d  >  e
hs.   In addition,
it  is possible (though not necessary) that decentralization leads to higher expected output than
hierarchy; i.e., that Y
d  > Y
hs.
E.  Hierarchy: the Case of Hard Information
The relative merits of a hierarchy increase when the information generated by division
managers can be hardened and passed along to the CEO.  To introduce hard information, I begin
by assuming that the division managers have the same research technology as before–that is, if
manager i makes an effort ei, he has a probability p(ei) of observing the signals on both of his
projects, i1 and i2.  Now, however, the CEO does no separate research of her own.  Instead, if a9This issue does not arise if one takes the alternative interpretation that the “capital
constraint” represents a shortage of some specialized physical asset (e.g., production facilities),
rather than an inability to raise more cash from outside investors.  
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division manager  learns something, there is a chance that he may be able to credibly
communicate it to the CEO.   Specifically, conditional on a division manager’s research being
successful and yielding information about his two projects, there is a probability z that this
information is verifiable, and can be shown directly to the CEO.  With probability (1 - z), the
information is non-verifiable, and can be used by the division manager, but not credibly
transmitted to the CEO.
None of the results that follow depend on the particular value of z–anything in the interval
(0, 1] works fine.  Thus one could in principle economize on notation by setting z = 1.  However,
I allow for z < 1 because it leads to a richer and more natural interpretation of the role of the
division managers.  When z < 1, there continue to be times when the information remains soft
and a division manager knows more than he can ever communicate to the CEO.   Thus the role of
the division manager goes beyond simply making reports to the CEO and then passively awaiting
his capital allocation–there are times when he can add further value by choosing how to best
spend his allocation.
Note that I am implicitly assuming that while hard information can be credibly
transmitted from division managers to the CEO, it cannot be transmitted to outside shareholders. 
For if such information could be shown directly to outside shareholders, it would no longer make
sense to specify that the firm faces a fixed, uncontingent liquidity constraint.  Rather, in cases
where a lot of positive information could be shown to shareholders, they might be willing to
invest more than four units in the firm.
9  10Under this interpretation, the  parameter z can be thought of as reflecting the ability or
effort of the CEO–a higher value of z means that the CEO can better evaluate the raw data
produced by the division managers.  As will be made clear below, when information is hard,
CEO and division-manager effort become strategic complements, as opposed to substitutes.
11Of course, as in any agency model, I have been assuming all along that division-
manager research effort is non-contractible–i.e., cannot be verified in court.  However, it is
stronger to assume that it cannot even be observed by the CEO.
20
What does it mean to assume that there is a type of  information that can be transmitted to
the CEO but not to shareholders?   Think of division managers as providing the CEO with a
variety of raw, albeit well-documented data about a project.  For example, if the project involves
drilling for oil in a new location, the raw data might be a set of geological studies. This raw data
does not literally say what the project’s dollar payoff  will be.  Instead, the raw data must be
combined with the CEO’s effort and expertise (e.g., her knowledge of geology, her assessment of
the costs of doing the drilling and extraction, etc.) to generate a final judgement about dollar
value.  The CEO’s final judgement–what she concludes after studying the raw data–is itself soft
information that cannot be credibly communicated to non-expert outside investors.
10 
Another crucial assumption is that the CEO does not observe the level of division-
manager research effort, nor can she tell whether or not this research has been successful.
11   
Consequently, when a division manager has hard information, he can choose whether or not to
report it to the CEO.    In particular, a division manager who gets hard information that his
projects are {B, B} may opt to simply keep quiet.  Importantly, this will not lead to an
“unraveling” situation where the CEO can infer that the state must be {B, B} simply because the
division manager is quiet.  This is because the division manager may also be quiet as a result of
not having obtained any hard information in the first place.21
The option to keep quiet when hard information is negative makes research very
attractive to the division manager.  To see why, assume that the CEO has a fixed conjecture ei
c
about the level of effort that manager i exerts, and a corresponding conjecture p
c = p(ei
c) about
the probability that his research is successful.   Now suppose that the division manager’s
reporting strategy is to reveal his hard information to the CEO when it is either {G, G} or {G, B},
but to keep quiet when it is {B, B}.  (As will be seen below, this reporting strategy constitutes
equilibrium behavior.)   Bayes’ rule implies that, given his conjecture of  p
c, the CEO will
interpret quiet as follows:
prob({B, B}/quiet) = 1/(4 - 3zp
c) (9) 
prob({G, G}/quiet) = (1 - zp
c)/(4 - 3zp
c) (10) 
prob({G, B}/quiet) = 2(1 - zp
c)/(4 - 3zp
c) (11) 
Taking the CEO’s conjecture of  p
c as fixed, a division manager frames the problem as
follows.  If he does no research, he will certainly be quiet, and the CEO will update on him
according to equations (9)-(11).  However, if he does devote some effort to research, he gains
pure option value.  If the research produces hard information that his division is either {G, G} or
{G, B}, he can speak up and thereby impress the CEO.   If the research produces hard information
that his division is {B, B}, he just keeps quiet and is no worse off than if he had done no research.
The bottom line is that, from the perspective of the division manager, there is now an
added benefit to doing research: if the information he generates is hard and positive, it can help
increase his capital budget and hence his private benefits.  This contrasts with both of the12There are other equilibria that differ insignificantly from that described in Proposition 3. 
When one division reveals {G, G} and the other reveals {G, B}, the CEO is actually indifferent
between allocating two units to each, or three to the former and one to the latter.  I focus on the
two-two allocation in the proposition (which implies that a manager with a {G, B} signal strictly
prefers to reveal it).  However, parts (iii) and (iv) of the proposition apply in either case. 
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previous scenarios–decentralization and hierarchy with soft information–where division
managers’ research efforts had no impact on the capital they were allocated. 
In the appendix, I provide a detailed characterization of  the case when information can be
hardened.  The key results can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 3: Assume that  g(2)/2  > (3g(1) +  b(1))/4.  Then in a hierarchy with hard
information, there is an equilibrium with the following properties:
i)  Division manager reporting strategies: Division managers reveal their hard information
if it is either {G, G} or {G, B}, and keep quiet if it is {B, B}.
ii)  CEO capital-allocation policy: If the CEO is facing one division that reveals itself to
be {G, G} and one that is quiet, the {G, G} division gets at least three (and possibly four) units of
capital.  In all other cases, the CEO allocates each division two units of capital.
iii)  Division manager benefit from being informed: Denote by )
hh the expected gross
output gain to a division manager from being informed in a hierarchy with hard information. 
This output gain significantly exceeds that under decentralization: )
hh > )
d + z/4. 
Consequently, division-manager research effort is greater than under decentralization:  e
hh  >  e
d .
iv) Output: Expected net output is greater than under decentralization: Y
hh  > Y
d.
The intuition behind parts (i) and (ii) of the proposition has already been discussed.
12  Part23
(iii) gives a quantitative sense for just how much stronger division managers’ research incentives
are when information can be hardened.  The expected output gain to being informed in a
hierarchy, )
hh, is now not just larger than that under decentralization )
d; it exceeds it by at least
z/4 .  This is a very substantial difference, since )
d is effectively denominated in units of net
return differentials, while z/4 is in units of gross capital.  To take a concrete example, reasonable
values of b(1), g(1) and g(2) might be 0.05, 0.10 and 0.19 respectively.  In other words, one
dollar invested in a B project yields a net present value (after all discounting) of five cents, etc. 
For these values, equation (2) says that )
d = 0.02.   But then if z is anywhere near one, then  z/4
is on the order of ten times the size of )
d .  Even for much smaller values of z, it will still be the
case that z/4 is much larger than )
d .
This all just reflects the fact that in a hierarchy with hard information, research effort can
actually influence a division manager’s gross capital budget.  In contrast, under decentralization
(or in a hierarchy with soft information) research effort only enables a division manager to get a
higher return from a given capital budget.  To the extent that division managers’ private benefits
are proportional to gross output, the former effect is naturally much stronger than the latter.
Part (iv) of the proposition–regarding expected net output–follows immediately from part
(iii).  Now a hierarchy does better than decentralization on both dimensions of importance.  Not
only does it generate more information at the division-manager level, and thereby lead to better
within-division allocations, but it also allows for reallocations across divisions when the CEO
learns that such reallocations are value-increasing.  
One might argue that the results in Proposition 3 in favor of hierarchy relative to
decentralization are now “too strong”–once information can be hardened, hierarchy24
unambiguously dominates decentralization for all parameter values, which seems unrealistic. 
Certainly the model omits a number of other factors that might tip the balance back towards
decentralization.  For example, other than research effort, the model assumes that division
managers do not need to take any other actions.  If one were to introduce another dimension of
non-contractible firm-specific investment, this might (following the logic of Grossman and Hart
(1986), Hart and Moore (1990), and Hart (1995)) be expected to make hierarchy less attractive.
But it is important to emphasize that I am much less interested in making absolute
unconditional statements about the virtues of hierarchy compared to decentralization, and more
interested in making comparative-statics statements about the circumstances under which
hierarchy is more likely to be attractive.  And the key result in this regard–that hierarchy looks
better when information is hard, as opposed to soft–seems like it should be robust to the
inclusion of various other factors into the model.
III.  Further Issues
A.  Does Decentralization Require Dis-Integration?
In the preceding discussion, I have been treating the concept of decentralization as loosely
synonymous with dis-integration, i.e., with the two divisions being spun off as independent
stand-alone entities.  Given how minimalist the model is on other dimensions–with no operating
synergies across the two divisions–this interpretation seems uncontroversial.  However, a harder
question arises if there are significant synergies, which would be lost in a breakup.  Then one
must ask whether it is possible to capture the benefits of decentralization in capital
allocation–i.e., to commit to division managers that they will always receive two units of25
funding–without a costly breakup.
Different authors have adopted different perspectives on this question.  Aghion and Tirole
(1997) assume that formal authority over certain decision rights can be contractually delegated to
managers in the organization other than the CEO.  In the context of the model here, this
assumption would correspond to the idea that the CEO can indeed be contractually prohibited
from getting involved in the capital allocation process.  Clearly, if this is the case, and if such
delegation does not interfere with the CEO’s ability do carry out other aspects of her job, the
benefits of decentralization can be obtained even in the context of a large integrated firm.
Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1999) take the opposite position, arguing that formal
authority over all decisions necessarily resides at the top of an organization.  In other words, a
CEO cannot irrevocably contract away her right to get involved in any decision.  If this is a better
description of reality, then there are limits to how far one can go towards the decentralized
outcome without a breakup.  Certainly, there are other devices short of a breakup that one can
employ to reduce the CEO’s ex post incentive to get involved; in this vein, Aghion and Tirole
(1997) suggest putting the CEO in a situation of “overload”, so that she is too busy to do much
research on her own.  And Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1999) emphasize the role of
reputation–in a repeated-game setting, the CEO may try to develop a reputation for being non-
interventionist.  But while these devices may be able to improve division managers’ incentives to
a degree, they will not in general have as strong an effect as a binding commitment that prevents
the CEO from altering the capital budget under any circumstances.
A middle-ground view might be that even if Aghion and Tirole (1997) are right, and it is
possible for the CEO to formally divest some types of decision rights, (e.g., the right to fire13Once one takes account of other factors, it is hard to imagine that the CEO would ever
want to divest this particular right, even if she legally could.  For example, given incomplete
contracting, it might be difficult for the CEO to surgically excise just her right to move capital
around without interfering with her ability to conduct other aspects of her job.
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certain workers without establishing just cause) it is unlikely that she can cede the specific right
that is of interest here, the right to make high-level capital allocation decisions.
13  Indeed, others
(Williamson (1975), Donaldson (1984), Stein (1997) and Scharfstein and Stein (2000)) have
argued that the CEO’s authority to move capital across divisions is the single most defining
characteristic of an integrated firm.
If this view is correct, it leads to the following qualitative conclusions.  Suppose that
based purely on division-manager research incentives, an analysis such as that in Section II.D
cuts in favor of decentralization.  Suppose further that the other, non-capital-allocation-related
synergies from integration are given by X.  When X is relatively small, it will make sense to
decentralize “to the max” by breaking up the firm.  However, when X is relatively large, it may
be better to preserve X  by  keeping the firm integrated, but at the same time to do as much as
possible with various internal devices (reputation, overload, etc.) to mimic–even if one cannot
fully replicate–the decentralized outcome in terms of division-manager incentives.       
B.  CEO Research Incentives: Why Soft Information Favors Flatter Organizations
In modeling a hierarchy with soft information, I have thus far taken as exogenous q, the
probability that the CEO’s research will be successful.  Now I ask what happens in the soft-
information case when the CEO’s incentives are also taken into account–i.e., when q = q(e
CEO),
where  e
CEO is the research effort exerted by the CEO, and where q( ), like p( ), is an increasing14The model of Aghion and Tirole (1997) produces a similar result.
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concave function.  For simplicity, I stick to the case where the star-gets-everything condition in
(5) is satisfied.
Denote by )
CEO the expected gain in net output that arises when, in a hierarchy with soft
information, the CEO’s research effort is successful.  This quantity is easily calculated by
evaluating Y
hs in equation (8) for both q = 1 and q = 0, and taking the difference:
)
CEO = p(e
hs)(2g(2) - b(1) - 3g(1))/4 +  (1 - p(e
hs))(3g(2) - 2b(1) - 4g(1))/4 (12)
An immediate consequence of equation (12) is that the CEO’s research is more valuable
when division managers do less research–i.e., when p(e




hs) = b(1) + g(1) - g(2) < 0 (13)
It then follows from the CEO’s first-order conditions that de
CEO/ de
hs < 0 also:  the CEO’s
research effort is reduced when the division managers are working hard.
14   The intuition behind
this result is straightforward.  Recall that the CEO, even when her research is successful, has at
best coarse information.  Thus while her tilting of the capital budget adds value on average, it
does have a cost  in some states of the world.  In particular, when faced with one division that is a
star (i.e., that is {G,G}) and one that is not, the CEO gives the star all four units of funding.  This
full tilting of the capital budget toward the star is optimal if it turns out that the non-star division15In other words, equilibrium involves the intersection of two downwards-sloping curves
in (e
CEO, e
hs) space.  Without any further restrictions on functional forms, it is possible that these
two curves may cross more than once.
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is {B, B}.  However, the tilt is too extreme if the non-star division turns out to be {G, B}–ideally,
it would be better to leave a {G, B} division with at least one unit of funding .  
In other words, because of her coarse information, an activist CEO sometimes takes away
too much from a {G, B} division.  And what is the cost of taking capital away from a  {G, B}
division?  It depends on how profitable this division can be expected to be.  If its division
manager is informed, the {G, B} division generates a greater expected return from a given
allocation of capital, as this capital is always steered to the better project within the division. 
Thus the opportunity cost of the CEO’s activism is greater when she runs the risk of taking
resources away from informed division managers.
Note the symmetry that is at work here: the CEO’s research  incentives are blunted by the
possibility that the division managers will become informed, much as the division managers’
incentives are blunted by the possibility that the CEO will become informed.   That is, the more
senior agent in the organization can be discouraged by the hard work of her subordinates, as well
as vice-versa.  
This symmetry has a couple of consequences.  First, since the CEO’s effort e
CEO is a
decreasing function of division managers’ efforts e
hs, and conversely, the model–without further
restrictions on the p( ) and q( ) functions–admits the possibility of multiple equilibria.
15  For
example, one might have either a “control-freak” equilibrium where the CEO is highly informed
and intervenes often, and where the division managers are very discouraged, or a  “laissez-faire”
outcome where the reverse occurs.  Depending on parameter values, one equilibrium will be ex29
ante more efficient than the other, and there is no guarantee that a firm will not get stuck in the
wrong equilibrium.  Thus, for example, the negative consequences of the hierarchical form of
organization may be more pronounced for a firm that has gotten stuck in a control-freak culture,
as opposed to one that has somehow managed to maintain a laissez-faire environment.     
A further implication of the model with endogenous CEO effort is that it suggests another
organizational form that may be optimal in some circumstances.  In the same way that
decentralization can be valuable as a precommitment to get the CEO out of the picture–and
thereby increase division-manager incentives–it might sometimes make sense to remove the
division managers, so as to increase CEO incentives.  It is easy enough to construct numerical
examples that have this feature.  The key is to make CEO effort both valuable and highly elastic,
while making division-manager effort less so.  In such cases, we are left with just the CEO
overseeing all four investment projects, which can be interpreted as an integrated (i.e., large) firm
with a flat management structure.  
Moreover,  the same logic–that removing some of her subordinates can improve the
performance of the CEO–leads to a richer and more interesting rendition of organizational
flatness if applied to a scaled-up version of the model.  Imagine that there are eight projects
within the firm, and that the firm is initially organized in a pyramid structure with three layers of
management: four low-level managers, who each oversee two projects; two mid-level managers,
who each oversee two low-level-managers; and the CEO.  Now consider the effects of stripping
out the two mid-level managers, leaving only the four low-level managers to report directly to the
CEO.  There will be two distinct positive incentive effects.  First, the low-level managers will
work harder, for the reasons outlined in Section II.D–they face less intervention from their16A large flat firm is all the more likely to be attractive if, in addition to soft information,
there are other operating synergies that cut in favor of integration.
17An example would be an academic department chair, who, having already decided that
he wants to make a tenure offer to somebody, undertakes the process of writing for outside
letters.  The letters may provide no new information to the department chair, but they can help
him to credibly sell the case to a less-well-informed dean.
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immediate supervisors.  Second, the CEO will also work harder, for the reasons developed just
above–she no longer anticipates that her research will be devalued by the competing efforts of
her immediate subordinates.       
Thus when we compare hard vs. soft information in terms of their implications for
organizational form, we now have a new conclusion.  Not only does soft information tend to
favor decentralization (i.e., smaller firms with fewer projects), but holding fixed a firm’s  size
and  scope, soft information also favors a flatter, more streamlined management structure.
16  To
put it simply, extra layers of management are more costly when information is soft.
C.  Hardness of Information is Endogenous: Excess Bureaucracy in Hierarchies
I have been assuming throughout that the hardness of information is exogenous–either a
division manager’s information can or cannot be credibly transmitted to the CEO, but there is
nothing that the division manager can do to influence this.  An alternative approach is to posit
that the degree of hardness is endogenous.  In particular, there may be cases where, by expending
additional effort on documentation, a division manager can harden information that would
otherwise be soft.
17
To capture this idea formally, I return to the version of the model in Section II.E, where
the CEO does no research of her own, and make one modification.  Now each division manager31
can choose between one of two research technologies: he can either put one unit of effort into
acquiring soft information, or he can put one unit of effort into acquiring hard information.  If he
opts for soft information, there is a probability  p
s that his research is successful.  If instead he
chooses to go after hard information, there is a probability p
h that his research is successful, and
conditional on success, a probability z that the information actually turns out to be verifiable.  I
assume that  p
h   = $p
s and $ < 1.  Thus effort devoted to acquiring hard information is less
productive.  A  high value of $  means that information about the project in question is by its
nature relatively easy to document, so that not too much of a price is paid to make it hard; one
can think of the previous cases of absolutely “hard” and “soft” information in Section II as
corresponding to the polar extremes where  $ = 1 and $ = 0  respectively.
It is easy to see that even when $  is substantially less than one, the only equilibrium may
be one in which both division managers opt to go after hard information.  If both managers go
after soft information, the CEO never learns anything, and we are effectively in a decentralized
outcome, with each division manager’s effort yielding him a private benefit of  p
s()
d .  In
contrast, if one division manager deviates and goes after hard information, we know from part
(iii) of Proposition 3 that this manager’s private benefit will exceed  p
h( ()
d + z/4).  So even
when p
h  is much smaller than  p
s, hard information can yield higher private benefits.  This is just
an application of the logic developed in Section II.E: hard information is much more attractive to
division managers, because, unlike soft information,  it can help them get a larger capital budget.
Moreover, while hard information is, all else equal, more valuable to the firm as a
whole–it enables the CEO to make value-enhancing reallocations–division managers’ preference
for it is far too strong.   That is, there are low values of  $  for which the firm would be better off18Note that when $ = 1, the firm is actually more valuable as a result of the fact that
division managers choose to go after hard, rather than soft information.  This corresponds to the
case where information is intrinsically hard, as in Section II.E.
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if the division managers pursued soft information, but division managers’ private incentives are
such that they pursue hard information instead.
18  This is because of an externality.  Manager i
gets a first-order benefit of ( when he generates hard information that lands his division one
additional unit of capital.  However, manager j  loses an equal amount, and the gain to the firm as
a whole is only proportional to the improved net return on this one unit.
This logic implies that when project information is innately hard to document (i.e., when
$  is small but non-zero) the costs of a hierarchical form of organization may manifest
themselves not just as division managers slacking off and doing no research, as in Section II.D.  
Rather, one may observe division managers working extremely hard at creating the wrong kind
of information.  In other words, a hierarchy may be characterized by a great deal of bureaucracy,
in the sense of division managers generating lots of reports that are very well-documented, but
ultimately not terribly informative.  And conversely,  if a  hierarchical firm is broken up, the
excessive bureaucracy vanishes, and division managers instead produce only soft information.   
IV.  Empirical Implications: A Closer Look at Banks’ Small-Business Lending Practices
The most basic implication of the theory developed above is that large, hierarchical firms
are at a comparative disadvantage when information about individual investment projects is
innately soft.   Moreover, if one takes the model seriously, the hardness or softness that is most
relevant for organizational form has to do with information about  those “small” projects that are
overseen by line managers.  In other words, what matters is the nature of  information that, in a19There are of course a number of big strategic investment decisions where no
information produced by line managers comes into play.  (E.g.: Should the company look for a
merger partner?  Or expand overseas?)  In such cases, one might think of  the CEO–perhaps with
the help of outside consultants–more or less doing all the research directly herself, so that
information transmission within the firm is not an issue.  Whether the information produced by
the CEO in these cases is hard or soft  is less relevant for organizational form.   
20See Tirole 1988 (Chapter 10) for a discussion of the replacement effect.
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hierarchical setting, would be produced far from the ultimate decisionmaker, the CEO.
19 
While these ideas would seem to have significant empirical content, there are many
challenges in mapping the theory into a set of precise, differentiating predictions that can be
readily tested.  For example, one interesting implication of the theory is that small firms might be
better able than large ones to engage in certain types of new product development, since the
prospects of many new products must often be assessed based on soft information.  However,
any empirical test of this proposition would have to control for a variety of other mechanisms
that could lead to a broadly similar outcome–e.g., the well-known “replacement effect”, whereby
large firms are discouraged from innovating for fear of cannibalizing their existing product
lines.
20  Implementing such a control would most likely require a careful case-by-case analysis of
the new products in question.   
 These sorts of complications underscore  why it can be particularly informative to look at
small-business lending by banks.  Here we have a well-defined  “industry” where: i) it is easy to
identify the primary “projects” that line managers must choose among–namely, individual loan
applications; and moreover ii) it seems quite plausible that information about these particular
projects is likely to be innately soft.21A recent survey by Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999) provides a much  more detailed
and comprehensive discussion of this literature.  
22Relatedly, Brickley, Linck and Smith (2000) document that large banks are the
dominant players in densely populated metropolitan areas (where presumably borrowers are more
likely to be big firms) while small banks have a greater role in suburban and rural regions. 
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The following findings emerge from the empirical literature on small-business lending.
21  
First, small banks invest a much greater share of their assets in small-business loans than do large
banks (Nakamura (1994), Berger, Kashyap and Scalise (1995), Berger and Udell (1996), Peek
and Rosengren (1996) and  Strahan and Weston (1996)).
22  Perhaps more strikingly, when large
banks acquire small banks, the small-business lending of the new combined organization tends to
fall significantly (Peek and Rosengren (1998), Berger et al (1998), Sapienza (1998)).  Moreover,
it appears that the loans that are cut as a result of consolidation are not cut simply because they
are negative-NPV–i.e., because the acquiring bank is cleaning out the bad loans of the target. 
Two pieces of evidence support this view.  Berger et al (1998) establish that many of the loans
that are cut in the process of consolidation are picked up by other banks in the same local market. 
And Sapienza (1998) finds that there is no relationship between a borrowing firm’s credit quality
and the likelihood that it will have its lending relationship severed following a merger.
Although these patterns are broadly consistent with the theory developed above, they do
not really pinpoint the exact mechanism at work.   That is, they do not explain why large banks
might be disadvantaged at small-business lending.  However, other findings are beginning to
emerge which speak more directly to the central idea of this paper, namely that large
organizations are not well-suited to handling soft information.   Three types of studies are
especially worth noting.23More precisely, standard measures of borrower credit quality do a better job of
explaining (in an R
2 sense) the loan approval decisions of large banks.
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First, it appears that it is not just bank size per se that discourages small-business lending,
but rather organizational complexity.  For example, DeYoung, Goldberg and White (1997) show
that controlling for a bank’s size and age, its proclivity for making small-business loans is also
negatively related to the number of branches it has, as well as to its being part of a multi-bank
holding company.  Keeton (1995) finds similar results, with a particularly negative effect on
small-business lending for banks that are owned by out-of-state holding companies.  
Second, there is some evidence that in making small-business loans, large banks tend to
shy away from those “difficult credits” where soft information is likely to be most important in
assessing whether or not the loan is positive-NPV.  Berger and Udell (1996) find that large banks
charge about 100 basis points less on small-business loans than do small banks, and require
collateral about 25% less often.  One interpretation of this result is that large banks only lend to
those small customers whose financial position is so strong that detailed further investigation is
not needed.
Finally, Cole, Goldberg and White (1997) use a new survey of small-business finance to
look at differences in the loan approval process across large and small banks.  They show that
large banks (over $1 billion in assets) tend to base loan approvals primarily on standard criteria
obtained from financial statements.  In contrast, “small banks deviate from these criteria more
and appear to rely on their impression of the character of the borrower to a larger extent.”
23  This
evidence fits very nicely with the spirit of the model developed above.
While much of the foregoing discussion has implicitly treated the softness of information36
in small-bank lending as an exogenously fixed parameter, there is evidence that this parameter is
changing over time, with improvements in information technology, widespread adoption of credit
scoring models, and the growth of “infomediaries” such as Dun and Bradstreet.  Petersen and
Rajan (2000) document that the physical distance between small firms and their bankers has been
growing–from an average of 16 miles in the 1970's to 68 miles in the 1990's–a pattern which they
interpret as evidence that an increasing amount of hard information is being brought to bear on
credit decisions.  If their interpretation is correct, and if this  trend continues, then the model of
this paper suggests that the comparative advantage of small banks in small-business lending
should diminish in the future.
V.  Related Theoretical Work
The ideas in this paper are related to several distinct strands of earlier theoretical work. 
Rather than attempting a comprehensive survey, I will just briefly discuss a few of the most
direct linkages.  One branch of the literature takes the perspective that firms are organized so as
to be maximally efficient at the processing and communication of various types of information. 
(See, e.g., Sah and Stiglitz (1986), Radner (1993), Bolton and Dewatripont (1994), Harris and
Raviv (1999)).   Although information production and transmission are clearly central to my
story as well, I differ from these other works in a couple of ways.  First, I focus explicitly on
managers’ private incentives to create and pass on various types of information, whereas the
above-mentioned papers abstract away from agency problems within the firm.  Second, the
notion of authority is more prominent in my model.  In particular, the CEO does more than just
listen to and act on reports from her subordinates; she actually controls the resources that these37
subordinates work with and derive utility from.
The soft-information variant of the model–which emphasizes how the CEO’s capital-
allocation authority can discourage division managers from doing research–is, as has already
been noted, closely related to Aghion and Tirole (1997).  On a similar note, Rotemberg and
Saloner (1994) argue that firms may wish to avoid being too broad in scope.  For if there are
credit constraints at the firm level, such narrowness can help the CEO commit to employees that
she will adopt any good ideas that they generate, thereby strengthening ex ante research
incentives.  More generally, the idea that agents’ incentives are weaker when they do not have
control over asset-allocation decisions is familiar from the work of Grossman and Hart (1986),
Hart and Moore (1990), and Hart (1995). 
However, a sharp distinction between my model and these “costs-of-integration” theories
arises when information is hard, rather than soft.  With completely hard information, there is no
downside to integration in my model.  To the contrary, the fact that division managers do not
have control actually serves to heighten their incentives, as they struggle to produce enough
positive information to convince the CEO to give them a larger share of the capital budget.  Thus
the model not only paints a generally more favorable picture of the incentive effects of
integration than much of the recent literature, its comparative statics with respect to the
hardness/softness of information also imply more nuanced empirical implications.  The empirical
distinctions among the theories are underscored by the facts from the banking industry: the other
cost-of-integration stories cannot easily explain why large banks might be at more of a
disadvantage in small-business lending than in, say, credit-card or mortgage lending.     
In some ways, the hard-information version of the model–with managers trying to24The positive, information-creating effects of self-interested advocacy have also been
emphasized by Rotemberg and Saloner (1995) and Dewatripont and Tirole (1999).
25Other papers that stress the negative aspects of intra-firm struggles for capital include
Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) and Scharfstein and Stein (2000).
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convince the CEO to give them more capital–is also reminiscent of the influence-cost literature
(Milgrom (1988), Milgrom and Roberts (1988), Meyer, Milgrom and Roberts (1992)).  However,
when information is innately hard (i.e., when $ = 1), the welfare implications are reversed. 
Unlike in the influence-cost models, division managers’ efforts to sway the CEO are productive
here, rather than wasteful.
24   It should be noted, though, that this positive result is quite sensitive
to the details of the information structure.  When the hardness of information is endogenous and
$ is low (as in Section III.C), division managers’ efforts to attract more capital can lead to
inefficient levels of bureaucracy, a result very much in the spirit of the influence-cost theories.
25  
Finally, it is worth touching on the connection between my model and recent work by
Hart and Moore (1999).   In their model, some agents (specialists) have ideas about individual
assets, while other agents (coordinators) have ideas about how to use multiple assets together. 
These ideas are mutually exclusive, so that only one agent’s idea can be implemented with a
given asset.  Moreover, there is no ex post renegotiation.  In this setting, the organization-design
problem is to allocate decision rights ex ante in such a way as to make sure that the best ideas get
implemented ex post.    
Perhaps the most significant distinction between the models has to do with Hart and
Moore’s assumption that the ideas of different agents in the firm are mutually exclusive.  This
exclusivity in turn rests on the premise that the firm’s assets can be combined in certain26For example, it is hard to imagine that Jack Welch, the CEO of General Electric, has
many ideas about how to use the assets of NBC and GE’s aircraft division together in a
synergistic fashion.  In the context of my model, Welch would not spend his time thinking about
how to generate synergies between these two divisions; instead he would think about which
division should get more capital. 
27This idea is stressed by Holmstrom and Tirole (1993), among others.
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synergistic ways–a premise that may be more appropriate in some situations than others.
26   In
contrast, in my model, the  research of the CEO and the division managers can be ex post
complementary.  Specifically, the CEO’s research can help her decide to allocate a certain
amount of capital to a given division manager, who then draws on his own more detailed
knowledge to make the right sub-allocations to individual projects within the division.  As a
result, there is no issue of ex post inefficiency when both the CEO and the division managers
have “ideas”.  Rather, the problem is the ex ante one of creating incentives for them to generate
these ideas in the first place.
 
VI.  Conclusions
By way of conclusion, it is useful to point out a limitation of the model developed above. 
At a fundamental level, the question being asked is: “What organizational form–decentralization
or hierarchy–does the best job of allocating capital to competing investment projects?”  But in
addressing the question, the entire focus has been on information production and transmission
inside firms.  As a result, the idea that valuable information might also be generated by outside
investors–e.g., by traders in the stock market–has been ignored.
27  In particular, I have been
implicitly assuming that outside investors have a fixed prior about investment opportunities, such
that they always find it optimal to give a firm exactly one unit of funding for each project that it28As noted above, even if the stock market (or any other outside capital provider)
produces the same information about divisions i and j as an integrated-firm CEO, it does not
follow that decentralization is equivalent to hierarchy.  This is because under decentralization
there is no analog to the CEO’s authority to take all funding away from a non-star division.  
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has under its control. 
Clearly, it would be nice to incorporate endogenous stock-market information production
into the model.  There are several further issues that this sort of extension might allow one to
address.  For example, the ability of outside investors to undertake their own research may alter
the net benefits of decentralization relative to hierarchy.  Recall that the drawback to splitting up
divisions i and j  in the model is that there is then no possibility of moving resources from i to j
when j has the better investment prospects.  But if outside investors can reproduce some of the
information that an integrated-firm CEO would otherwise generate, then stock prices might be
useful in guiding reallocations from  i to  j.
28
Moreover, further subtleties arise when one recognizes that the quality of stock-market
information is likely to depend on firm size and scope.  On the one hand, a potential advantage of
decentralization is that it leads to stock prices that are specific to narrow, “pure-play”  sets of
assets, thereby providing more precise guidance for investment decisions.  On the other hand,
pushed too far, decentralization may dampen the overall amount of stock-market information that
is produced: given fixed costs of information acquisition, very small firms may not attract much
interest from either sophisticated investors or stock analysts.  By taking such factors into
consideration, one might hope to develop a more complete understanding of the link between
organizational form and the efficiency of capital allocation.41
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2:
First, straightforward calculation establishes that a sufficient condition for the CEO to
prefer an allocation of at least three units to a lone-star division (rather than just giving two units
to each division) is: g(2)/2 > (2g(1) +  b(1))/3.  This condition is clearly satisfied if, as the
proposition requires, g(2)/2 > (3g(1) +  b(1))/4.  So it must be that a lone-star division will get at
least three units of funding.
Now suppose that a lone-star division does in fact get exactly three units of funding.  It is
easy to show that equation (6) in the text is modified so that the gain )
hs in expected net output
when a division manager’s research is successful is given by:
)
hs =  )
d  -  q(2g(2) - 3g(1) - b(1))/16     (A.1)
But given the condition in the proposition, we know that (2g(2) - 3g(1) - b(1)) is positive. 
So )
hs <  )
d, which in turn implies that e
hs <  e
d.   Thus even when the tilt in the capital budget is
less extreme, a hierarchy induces less research effort than under decentralization.  That a
hierarchy also may also lead to lower output–i.e., that we may have Y
hs < Y
d–follows from the
same reasoning as in the example that was used to illustrate Proposition 1 in the text.  
Proof of Proposition 3:
I begin by assuming that the division-manager reporting strategies are as described in part42
(i) of the proposition; I will verify momentarily that these strategies are optimal for the division
managers.  With these reporting strategies, the CEO updates on a quiet division manager using
equations (9)-(11) in the text.  Given these updating rules, let us ask what the CEO does when
she faces one division manager that reports {G, G} and another one that is quiet.  It is not hard  to
show that, for any value of  zp
c, it will be optimal for the CEO to give at least three units of
capital to the {G, G} division if the following sufficient condition (which is the one required in
the statement of the proposition) holds: g(2)/2 > (3g(1) +  b(1))/4.   Conversely, it is easy to see
that there is never any advantage to deviating from the equal-funding allocation under any other
circumstances. 
If the CEO follows these capital-allocation rules, then it must in fact be optimal for a
division manager to speak up when his information is either {G, G} or {G, B}.  In the former
case, he may get a third or fourth unit of capital by speaking up, and in the latter case, he ensures
that he will not be reduced down to one or zero units (which could happen if he were quiet and 
the other division reported {G, G}).  It is also at least weakly better for the division manager to
remain silent when his information is {B, B}.  Indeed, for many parameter values it is strictly
better, since a division that reports {B, B} will get allocated zero units of capital in circumstances
when a quiet division would get one unit.
These arguments establish parts (i) and (ii) of the proposition.  To prove part (iii), assume
that when a {G, G} division manager is paired with a quiet one, the former is allocated exactly
three units of capital.  This will establish a lower bound on the gains to being informed, as being
informed would be strictly more attractive if a {G, G} division were to get four units of capital in
this situation.  Now take the perspective of manager i, assuming that manager j exerts effort of ej43
and therefore has a probability of research success of p(ej ).   (This implies that there is a
probability zp(ej ) that manager j will uncover hard information, and a probability zp(ej )/4  that
manager j will be able to document to the CEO that his division is {G, G}.)  A little algebra
yields the following expression for the expected gross output gain  )i




d +  z/4 +  z(4g(2) - 4g(1))/16 +  z p(ej )(2g(1) + 2b(1) - 2g(2))/16  +
 z




d +  z/4 +  z p(ej )(2g(2) + 2b(1) - 2g(1))/16  +  z
2 p(ej )(2g(1))/16 (A.3)
It then follows immediately from (A.3) that   )i
hh > )
d +  z/4 for any value of  p(ej ),
which establishes part (iii) of the proposition.  Part (iv) is then obvious, since in a hierarchy with
hard information there is both more information produced than under decentralization, plus the
added advantage that the CEO reallocates funds across divisions according to a value-
maximizing criterion.44
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